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THOMPSON V. SHAPIRO:
RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS
AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE*
The most fundamental of all rights is the right to life. To
Jefferson and the framers of the Constitution .. . the right to
life meant the right not to be deprived of life. The right to life
was to them in very truth a "natural" right. For it was a life that
God gave and nature supported.1
The recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Thompson v.
Shapiro2 invalidating the durational residence requirement for state and
federal welfare assistance removes a basic infringement on the constitu-
tional rights of welfare recipients. In a long-awaited and broadly-written
opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for a 6-3 majority, ruled that a
one-year residence requirement constituted an invidious discrimination,
denying welfare recipients the equal protection of the laws by depriving
them of "the ability . . . to obtain the very means to subsist-food,
shelter, and [the] other necessities of life. '" 3
Historically, residence tests originated with the localism of the
Elizabethan Poor Laws 4 and the concomitant notion of settlement,5
i.e., the idea that each individual belonged to a certain place which was
obligated to support him in his time of need.6 Under this system, before
liability could be affixed for support, the indigent had to establish a
This paper was prepared by the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
1 A. SMITH, THE RIGHT TO LIFE 12 (1955).
2 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
3 Id. at 627.
447 Eliz., c.2 (1601).
[T]he Elizabethan Poor Law was both a consolidation of earlier Tudor statutes
and a consummation of English experience with the care of the poor. A growth
rather than a creation, it contained almost nothing new but fixed the character
of poor relief for three centuries not only in England but in America as well.
Today, its principal features linger in the welfare programs of all of our states.
ten Broek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development,
and Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REv. 257, 258 (1964).
5 See Mandelker, Tile Settlement Requirement in General Assistance, 1955 WASH.
U.L.Q. 355-56.
6 Id.
settlement in the particular locality which
was to be made liable. 7 The concept of
residence thus became fused with the idea
of relief for the poor long before our
present public assistance laws.
Perhaps because of their very antiquity,
the constitutionality of settlement provi-
sions was never seriously questioned. In
fact, prior to 1966, the residence require-
ments imposed by various state welfare
programs received only two constitutional
challenges. In the first, Rutland v. Men-
don,s a Massachusetts court declared that
the legislature possessed sufficient authority
to enact a statute establishing a three-year
residence period as a prerequisite to the
achievement of settlement status by a pau-
per. In the second case, People ex rel.
Heydenreich v. Lyons,9 decided in 1940,
the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a state
statute requiring applicants for assistance
to have resided in a city for the three years
immediately preceding the date of applica-
tion. The court, pointing out that the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment merely requires that a classification
be based upon a real and substantial dis-
tinction having a rational relation to the
subject of the legislation, 10 concluded that
no fundamental rights were impaired by the
statute in question. Thus, it was not until
7 The Settlement Act of 1662, 13 & 14 Car. 2,
c.12, provided that any person "likely to be
chargeable" to the parish, who was not in
residence for forty days, could be returned to
his place of settlement. Additionally, the pre-
amble of the Act declared: "By reason of some
defect in the law, poor people are not restrained
from going from one parish to another."
8 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 154 (1822).
9 374 I11. 557, 30 N.E.2d 46 (1940).
10 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93 (1965).
See also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964).
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the recent wave of welfare cases that the
constitutionality of residence requirements
was put to a true test and found wanting. 1
The opinion of the Supreme Court in
Thompson is founded upon the twin pillars
of equal protection and the right to travel.
However, it is not entirely certain whether
the majority opinion rests primarily upon
the interference with what is today consid-
ered to be a "fundamental" right-the right
to travel freely. 12
The Right to Travel
While its specific source is somewhat
questionable, the fundamental right to
freely travel is today clearly conceded."3
Although the Articles of Confederation
provided that "the people of each State
shall have free ingress and regress to and
11 Prior to the Supreme Court decision in
Thompson v. Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618 (1969),
there had been several federal district court
decisions invalidating residency tests. See, e.g.,
Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C.
1967); Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 64
(E.D. Pa. 1967); Green v. Dep't of Public
Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967);
Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D.
Conn. 1967); accord, Robinson v. Ott, 284 F.
Supp. 735 (D. Mass. 1968); Ramos v. Health
& Social Services Bd., 276 F. Supp. 474 (D. Wis.
1967). Contra, Waggoner v. Rosen, 286 F. Supp.
275 (M.D. Pa. 1968); Harrell v. Board of
Comm'rs, 269 F. Supp. 919 (D.D.C. 1967).
12 See Graham, A Poor Person's Right to Life,
Liberty, and Property, 17 WELFARE L. BULL. 29
(1969).
1:3 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
Although there have been recurring differ-
ences in emphasis within the Court as to the
source of the constitutional right of inter-
state travel, there is no need here to canvass




from any other state,"' 4 that right finds no
explicit mention in the Constitution. Never-
theless, its existence was promptly con-
ceded by the judiciary 15 and it has been
established that its scope encompasses both
interstate16 and international' 7 travel.
One of the earliest attempts to justify
the right to travel relied upon the com-
merce clause, but was rejected by the Su-
preme Court on the grounds that "persons
are not the subject of commerce.""' Yet,
just twelve years later, the Supreme Court
apparently accepted this contention in the
Passenger Cases.19 While it is not clear
whether the Court relied on the commerce
clause in Crandall v. Nevada,20 it is certain
that that decision stands for the proposi-
tion that the citizens of this country pos-
14 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV, appear-
ing in A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 241 (H.
Lefler ed. 1963).
15 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (No.
3,230) (D. Pa. 1823) (right to travel interstate
was founded upon the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Art. IV, § 2).
16 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
17 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1965);
Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06
(1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-27
(1958). These cases invoked the fifth amend-
ment notion of "liberty" in discussing the right
to travel.
18 City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.)
102, 135 (1837).
1948 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (by a 5-4
decision the Court invalidated a state tax on
passengers arriving from foreign ports). See
Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence
Tests for General and Categorical Assistance
Programs, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 567, 584-85 (1966).
See also Henderson v. New York, 92 U.S. 259,
266-67 (1875) so interpreting the Passenger
Cases.
2073 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43-44 (1867) (tax im-
posed on all persons leaving the state by com-
mercial vehicle invalid as a violation of the
right to travel freely).
sess the right to have free access to
governmental centers. Thus, the right to
move freely from state to state became an
incident of national citizenship. 2'
The landmark case in the area of free
movement, and that most applicable to the
residence requirement for welfare assis-
tance, is Edwards v. California.22 In Ed-
wards, all nine justices of the Court
invalidated a state statute making it a mis-
demeanor to knowingly bring a nonresident
indigent into the state. Although all con-
curred in the result, five members of the
Court, in a majority opinion by Mr. Jus-
tice Byrnes, specifically based their con-
clusion upon the commerce clause. They
held that "the transportation of indigent
persons from state to state clearly falls
within [the] class of subjects . . . [pre-
empted by the federal government under
the commerce clause]. 2 1 The other four
justices, in two separate concurring opin-
ions,24 thought the state statute invalid be-
cause it infringed a freedom of interstate
movement embodied in the privileges and
immunities clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. While all of the justices affirmatively
supported one of the available constitu-
tional theories, only Mr. Justice Jackson
deemed it necessary to dispose of the al-
ternative argument. 2 He explicitly rejected
21 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 181
(1941).
22314 U.S. 160 (1941).
25 id. at 176.
24 Justice Douglas joined by Justices Black and
Murphy concurred in one opinion, 314 U.S. at
177, and Justice Jackson concurred separately.
Id. at 181.
25 The majority found it unnecessary to decide
whether the privileges and immunities clause of
the fourteenth amendment had been violated.
This is reflected in Mr. Justice Byrnes' state-
the commerce clause, arguing that it was
clearly inapplicable to "migrations of a
human being."' 26 Thus, "[i]t is fair to sum-
marize Edwards as representing a vote of
5-1 for finding a violation of the Com-
merce Clause and of 4-0 for finding a
violation of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ' '27
While prior right to travel cases were
concerned with absolute proscriptions on
the freedom of movement, the vital ques-
tion when contesting the constitutionality
of a residency requirement for welfare as-
sistance is whether an indirect burden on
a citizen's right to travel is also prohibited.
A federal district court in Thompson
v. Shapiro2s interpreted United States v.
Guest29 as proscribing even a discourage-
ment of interstate travel.30 Additional sup-
ment, after deciding the case under the com-
merce clause: "In the view we have taken it
is unnecessary to decide whether the Section
is repugnant to other provisions of the Consti-
tution." 314 U.S. at 177. The concurring
opinion penned by Mr. Justice Douglas begins:
"I express no view on whether or not the statute
here in question runs afoul of [the commerce
clause] .. " Id.26 Id. at 182.
27 Harvith, supra note 19, at 581.
28 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967).
29 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
30 In Guest the indictment charged interference
with "the right to travel freely to and from the
State of Georgia and to use highway facilities
and other instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce within the State of Georgia." Id. at 757.
The Guest Court then elaborated on this right:
"if the predominant purpose of the conspiracy is
to impede or prevent the exercise of the right of
interstate travel, or to oppress a person be-
cause of his exercise of that right, then, ...the
conspiracy is a proper object of the federal
law .... " Id. at 760 (emphasis added). The
federal district court in Thompson therefore
concluded: "By employing the words 'impede'
and 'oppress', the Court must have contemplated
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port for this proposition can be found in
two other sources. First, the statute in Ed-
wards did not directly bar access to the
State of California. The indigent Duncan,
from whose perspective the case was de-
cided, was already in California; the stat-
ute in question penalized only the sponsor
who knowingly brought the indigent into
the state. It was unconstitutional not be-
cause it directly barred entry, but because
it deterred and impeded movement into
the state. Secondly, one can analogize to
cases prohibiting actions having adverse ef-
fects upon constitutional rights, or penal-
izing those who choose to exercise them. 31
Thus, whatever the specific source of the
right, it is clear that it proscribes both di-
rect and indirect burdens on the right of
free movement. The concurrence of Mr.
Justice Jackson in Edwards both subscribes
to this view and delineates in timeless lan-
guage the dimensions of the right:
[lit is a privilege of citizenship of the
United States, protected from state abridg-
ment, to enter any state of the Union,
either for temporary sojourn or for the
establishment of permanent residence
therein and for gaining resultant citizen-
ship thereof. If national citizenship means
less than this, it means nothing.
State citizenship is ephemeral. It results
only from residence and is gained or lost
therewith. That choice of residence was
subject to local approval is contrary to the
inescapable implications of the westward
movement of our civilization.32
that the discouragement of interstate travel is
also forbidden." 270 F. Supp. at 336.
31 See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570,
581 (1968). See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479 (1965); Wolff v. Selective Service Bd.
No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
32 314 U.S. at 183.
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That a state's residency requirement for
welfare assistance must necessarily impinge
upon a citizen's right to freely travel inter-
state was foreshadowed by Mr. Jus-
tice Jackson's concurrence in Edwards,
wherein he stated:
Any measure which would divide our citi-
zenry on the basis of property into one
class free to move from state to state and
another class that is poverty-bound to the
place where it has suffered misfortune is
not only at war with the habit and custom
by which our country has expanded, but is
also a short-sighted blow at the security of
property itself. Property can have no more
dangerous, even if unwitting, enemy than
one who would make its possession a pre-
text for unequal or exclusive civiI rights.
Where those rights are derived from na-
tional citizenship no state may impose such
a test .... 3
Therefore, the Supreme Court, in
Thompson, rejected as an impermissible
burden on the freedom of interstate move-
ment 34 the states' contention that the
residence requirement was justified as a
protection of the fiscal integrity of their
public assistance programs. Mr. Justice
Brennan, in explicating the Court's posi-
tion, emphasized that
we do not doubt that the one-year waiting
period device is well suited to discourage
the influx of poor families in need of assis-
tance. An indigent who desires to migrate,
resettle, find a new job, start a new life
will doubtless hesitate if he knows that he
must risk making the move without the
possibility of falling back on state welfare
assistance during his first year of residence,
33 1d. at 185.
314 Thompson v. Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31
(1969).
when his need may be most acute. But the
purpose of inhibiting migration by needy
persons into the state is constitutionally
impermissible. 35
Other purposes relating to fiscal integrity,
such as preventing the receipt of welfare
assistance by indigents who entered the
state seeking higher welfare benefits, and
differentiating between old and new res-
idents"', on the basis of their relative tax
contributions to the state treasury, were
also rejected as impermissible under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment 7
Equal Protection
State residence tests seek to limit eligi-
bility for welfare assistance to the residents
of their state; however, not all residents
are eligible for assistance. Arbitrarily and
without reason, durational residence re-
quirements discriminate between residents
meeting the required period and those who
do not." Historically, classifications dis-
. Id. at 629.
3 In addition, the Connecticut Welfare Statute,
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-2d (Supp. 1965),
invalidated by the Court distinguished between
three types of new residents: 1. those who
entered with a cash stake, 2. those who enter
with a job opportunity, and 3. those who enter
with neither. It is only the third category
which must satisfy Connecticut's one-year resi-
dence requirement. See CONN. WELFARE MAN.
ch. 11, §§ 219.1, 219.2.
37 394 U.S. at 631-33.
3s There are two basic welfare programs: 1.
those funded by both the states and federal
government (Categorical Assistance Program)
under the aegis of the Social Security Act, 49
Stat. 620 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
1394 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
1396d (Sipp. 1 1965), and 2. those funded solely
by the states. For programs funded solely by
the states various periods of residence have been
criminating among residents have been
skeptically scrutinized by the courts, and
have generally been found wanting of any
rational basis.39 Thus, when a state law
treats classes of persons differently, it can
be valid only if the classifications are rea-
sonable in light of the statute's purpose. 40
The reasonableness of diversity of treat-
ment can be measured by various factors.
Primarily, the judiciary attempts to balance
the interest of the state in maintaining such
classifications against the impact on indi-
vidual rights and values. 41 In Oyama v.
California,4 2 the Supreme Court held that
diversity and disparity of treatment could
not be justified by "some remote adminis-
trative benefit [accruing] to the state." 43
authorized. These have ranged from a maximum
of five years, e.g. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164:1
(1967) to those states which require no stated
period of residence, e.g., HAWAII REV. LAWS
§ 108-15 (Supp. 1963), in order to qualify for wel-
fare assistance. Those states participating in the
federal assistance program are authorized to
impose a maximum one-year residency test,
e.g., 49 Stat. 627 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(b) (1964).
-9 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965);
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948);
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). See also
Green v. Dep't of Public Welfare, 270 F. Supp.
173 (D. Del. 1967); Ramos v. Health & Social
Services Bd., 276 F. Supp. 474 (D. Wis. 1967);
but see Drueding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721
(D. Md. 1964), af0'd per curia/n, 380 U.S. 125
(1965) (upholding one-year residency require-
ment for voting).
40 E.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93
(1965); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
191 (1964); Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers,
358 U.S. 522, 527-28 (1959), and cases cited
therein. See also Tussman & ten Broek, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
341, 344-53 (1949).
41 Harvith, supra note 19, at 610.
42 332 U.S. 633, 646-47 (1948).
43 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646-47
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Essentially, this means that the classifica-
tion infringing upon the rights of a selected
class of persons is unjustified and, hence
invalid, when a less restrictive statute
would also satisfy the needs of the state.
The continuing validity of this standard
was demonstrated in Carrington v. Rash,44
wherein the Court held that the equal pro-
tection clause was violated by a provision
of the Texas constitution which prohibited
servicemen who moved to Texas during
their tour of service from voting in any
election in the state while they remained in
the army. The fundamental defect implicit
in the provision was the denial of the fran-
chise to all servicemen, regardless of their
intention to establish a home in Texas.
The Court rejected the state's contention
that the onerous administrative burden in-
volved in determining which military per-
sonnel had a bona fide intention to become
residents provided a sufficient justification
for denying a basic right to all military per-
sonnel moving to Texas.4" ' This is the same
basic defect of "overinclusiveness" encom-
passed within the one-year residency re-
quirement.4"
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court pointed
out that the state could not even validly
"fence out" those indigents who entered
(1948); Carrington v. Rash 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
See also Harvith, supra note 19, at 610.
44380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
45 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
46 Thompson v. Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618, 631
(1969). See also Green v. Dep't of Public Wel-
fare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (1967). However, an
"underinclusive" statute is permissible as the
Legislature is permitted to adopt a go-slow ap-
proach to solving a problem. See, e.g., Railroad
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949).
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the state for the sole purpose of seeking
higher welfare benefits.4 1
Implicit in any such distinction is the no-
tion that indigents who enter a state with
the hope of securing higher welfare bene-
fits are somehow less deserving than indi-
gents who do not take this consideration
into account. But we do not perceive why
a mother who is seeking to make a new
life for herself and her children should be
regarded as less deserving because she con-
siders, among other factors, the level of a
state's public assistance. Surely such a
mother is no less deserving than a mother
who moves into a particular state in order
to take advantage of its better educational
facilities.
48
Thus, although the Court explicitly recog-
nized that a state has a valid interest in
preserving the fiscal integrity of its pro-
grams, it prohibited the accomplishment of
such a purpose by invidious distinctions
between classes of citizens.""
The Thompson Court next turned to the
four stated objectives which were conceded
to be permissible state interests: (1) facil-
itating the planning of the welfare budget;
47 394 U.S. at 631. This statement by the Court
apparently invalidates New York State's Wel-
fare Abuse Law, N.Y. Soc. SERVICEs LAW,
§ 139-a (McKinney ch. 184 (May 10, 1969)).
See also infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
In accordance with the Thompson decision Sec-
tion 139-a of the New York Social Services Law,
which provided:
Any person who shall apply for home relief or
aid to dependent children within one year after
arrival in the state, shall be presumed to have
come into the state for the purpose of receiving
public assistance or care
was declared unconstitutional because it violated
the welfare recipient's right to travel. Gaddis v.
Wyman, 69 Civ. No. 2921 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25,
1969).
48 394 U.S. at 631-32.
40 d. at 633.
(2) providing an objective test of res-
idency; (3) minimizing the opportunity
for recipients to receive payments from
more than one jurisdiction; and (4) en-
couraging early entry of new residents into
the labor force. However, before the Court
determined whether these concededly valid
state objectives justified the imposition of a
residency requirement, it rejected the tradi-
tional "rational or reasonable basis" stan-
dard " for an equal protection argument,
and instead, substituted a "compelling" in-
terest test.!' The Court justified the imposi-
tion of a more stringent standard by
contending that the equal protection argu-
ment, when meshed with the exercise of a
constitutional right, i.e., the right to travel,
proscribes the state from inhibiting the ex-
ercise of that right unless vital state inter-
ests are involved. 52
Although the Thompson Court utilized
the "compelling" interest to void the res-
idence requirement, the Court's dicta is
also relevant. While conceding the presence
of valid state objectives in establishing a
residence test, Mr. Justice Brennan's ma-
jority opinion argued that these stated ob-
jectives were contradicted by both state
welfare practices and needs; thus, even
if the traditional "reasonable basis" test
were to be utilized, the imposition of a
residence requirement would not be jus-
tified:
50 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U.S. 61, 78 (1911); see also Fleming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603 (1960).
51 394 U.S. at 634.
52 Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406
(1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524
(1960); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942).
[E]ven inder traditional equal protection
tests a classification of welfare applicants
according to whether they have lived in
the state for one year would seem irra-
tional and unconstitutional.53
After the Thompson Court applied both
the equal protection and right to travel
doctrines to invalidate the Connecticut 54
and Pennsylvania5 5  one-year residence
tests, it was still confronted by the problem
of the District of Columbia's provision,56
which had been enacted through an exer-
cise of Congress' federal power over the
District of Columbia. However, even Con-
gress is prohibited from utilizing its plen-
ary power over the District of Columbia
in a discriminatory manner. Consequently,
the implementation of a one-year require-
ment was held by the Court to be a viola-
tion of the fifth amendment's due process
clause because "while the Fifth Amend-
ment contains no equal protection clause,
it does forbid discrimination that is 'so un-
justifiable as to be violative of due pro-
cess.' 57 Thus, in accordance with its
opinion invalidating the Connecticut and
Pennsylvania requirements, the Court also
invalidated the District of Columbia stat-
ute, holding that "the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment prohibits Con-
gress from denying public assistance to
poor persons otherwise eligible solely on
the ground that they have not been res-
idents of the District of Columbia for one
year at the time their applications are
filed."5 s
53 394 U.S. at 638.
54 CONN. GEN. STAT. Riv. § 17-2d (Supp. 1965).
5 5 PA. STAT., Tit. 62, § 432(6) (1968).
5 6 D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-203 (1967).
57 Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964);
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
58 394 U.S. at 642.
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A dissenting opinion, authored by Mr.
Chief Justice Warren and joined by Mr.
Justice Black, concluded that Congress had
authority to either recognize minimal na-
tionwide residence requirements or autho-
rize the states to do so under the commerce
clause. Additionally, they contended that
any burden on the right to interstate travel
was uncertain, and, when evaluated in the
light of a reasonable congressional purpose
to encourage greater state participation in
the welfare program, minimal at best.
Since the congressional decision is rational
and the restriction on travel insubstantial,
I conclude that residence requirements can
be imposed by Congress as an exercise of
its power to control interstate commerce
consistent with the constitutionally guar-
anteed right to travel. 59
In conclusion, both Justices rejected the
more stringent "compelling" interest test,
and reiterated their reliance upon the clas-
sic "rational basis" test. Hence, the classifi-
cation created by the waiting period was
deemed to be a valid exercise of legislative
power by the states.
Mr. Justice Harlan, in a separate dissent,
rejected both the right to travel argument
and the majority's application of the "com-
pelling interest" standard. The Justice be-
lieved that any burden on the freedom of
movement was counter-balanced by the
state interest in requiring a period of res-
idence prior to the receipt of welfare as-
sistance. Mr. Justice Harlan found even
more fault with the "compelling" interest
standard, since the majority appeared to be
applying the test as "if the result of the
classification . . . [might] affect a 'funda-
59 Id. at 652.
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mental right' regardless of the basis of the
classification. He therefore found no equal
protection objection to the residence re-
quirement since the objectives of the wait-
ing-period were rationally related to it.
' '60
It is apparent from the majority opinion
that residency tests will not be tolerated
when applied to the receipt of welfare as-
sistance. Even the traditional argument,
accepted by the Illinois Supreme Court in
Heydenreich, that welfare is a "privilege"
and not a "right", will not serve as justifi-
cation for a state to arbitrarily classify its
residents."' Once a state has voluntarily
enacted a program of welfare assistance,
any discrimination in the application of the
program's benefits will be intolerable. A
state must apply the benefits of its pro-
grams to all its residents in an even-handed
manner; however, a minimal residence test
may be justified to prevent fraud and abuse
of the welfare program, and to ensure that
the applicant is a resident of the state. 62
In accordance with the opinion of the
Supreme Court, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare has established an
interim policy barring residence tests as a
condition for eligibility in categorical as-
sistance programs. 3 Additionally, when
eligibility is keyed to residence within the
state, HEW has established the following
criteria for determining whether an appli-
cant qualifies:
60 Comment, Supreme Court Holds Durational
Residence Requirements Unconstitutional, 17
WELFARE L. BULL. 2, 3 (1969).
61 394 U.S. at 627 n.6. See Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963); see also Thompson
v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967).
62 394 U.S. at 637.
63 45 C.F.R. § 202.3, 34 Fed. Reg. 8715 (June
3, 1969).
A resident . . . is one who is living in the
state voluntarily . . . , with no intention
of presently removing therefrom [or a]
child . . . making his home in the state.
Temporary absence from the state, with
subsequent returns ... , or intent to return
when the purposes of the absence have
been accomplished, shall not interrupt con-
tinuity of residence. 64
The regulation further provides that eligi-
bility determinations of residence "may not
depend upon the reason for which the in-
dividual enters the state."' '5 This explicitly
recognizes the "right" of a welfare recip-
ient to seek higher benefits in another state.
While the Court has invalidated these
patently discriminatory residence require-
ments, it has not answered what has been
termed the ultimate question. Expressed in
the extreme, the question can be phrased
in terms of "[w]hether a state may consti-
tutionally permit its indigents to die from
starvation or from exposure to the ele-
ments."66
"The Right to Life"
Nearly fifteen years ago, Professor A.
Delafield Smith first posited the question
whether the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment mandated the creation
of a legal right in all persons to the basic
necessities of life:0 7
Our ancient Bill of Rights thus needs to
64 Id. at § 202.3(b), 34 Fed. Reg. 8715 (June 3,
1969).
65 Id.
66 Graham, supra note 12, at 31. See 16 WEL-
FARE L. BULL. 17-18 (1969) and 15 WELFARE L.
BULL. 15 (1968) for an enumeration of cases
which seek to establish an absolute right for
indigents to receive food benefits.
67 A. SMITH, THE RIGHT To LIFE (1955).
be supplemented by legal guarantees that
reflect the dependency of the individual
upon his fellow men, in terms not alone
of safeguards against positive injury but
also for inclusion in those media which so-
ciety has been called upon to supply for
the support of its membership. The indi-
vidual must regain the sense of living in
an environment whose responses in areas
essential to the support and development
of his life are legally available and may
not be capriciously withheld under the
law.68
Under this view of the relationship between
man and society, the individual would be
guaranteed those things necessary to the
maintenance of human life: (1) for those
in the labor market, both a job and wage
insurance; (2) for those not able to enter
the labor market, food, shelter, and cloth-
ing, and (3) for both categories, remedial
health service.6 9
This concept of man and society has not
been accorded much credence by the
courts, which have characterized welfare
not as a right, but as a mere gratuity
granted by the state. 70 However, it can be
contended that this view does have some
historical validity, at least in the United
States.71 The adoption of the Declaration
of Independence by the Continental Con-
gress on July 4, 1776 should have in-
grained for future generations of Amer-
icans the idea that man was "endowed...
with certain unalienable rights, that among
these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness [and] [t]hat to secure these
(8 Id. at 100.
69 Id. at 98.
70 People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 Ill.
557, 30 N.E.2d 46 (1940).
71 SMITH, supra note 67; see also Graham, supra
note 12.
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rights, governments are instituted among
[mien .... -72 However, as yet, in our so-
ciety the individual holds no general right
to even bare economic subsistence. In part,
this is due to the courts' traditional view of
social programs,7 3 i.e., the reflection of the
popular conception that these programs
represented public charity,74 and as such,
should be hedged by every conceivable
detriment to abuse. Further support for the
view that society has both a moral and
legal obligation to care for its less fortunate
members can be gleaned from Article 25
of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. This article was adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations,
and was part of a declaration which at-
tempted to enumerate for all mankind the
fundamental dignities which could not be
denied:
Everyone has the right to a standard of
living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and his family, including
food, clothing, housing and medical care
and necessary social services, and the right
to security in the event of unemployment,
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or
other lack of livelihood in circumstances
beyond his control. 75
While these humane considerations have
not yet been deemed fundamental rights
by our courts there have been indications
that the judiciary is moving in this direc-
tion. For instance, dicta in Green v. De-
72 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, appearing in,
A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 194 (H. Lefler
ed. 1963).
7 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
74 SMITH, supra note 67, at 7.
75 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art.
25 (adopted December 10, 1948 by the General
Assembly of the United Nations).
THOMPSON V. SHAPIRO
partment of Public Welfare76 seems to
elevate welfare to a "fundamental liberty",
one even more fundamental than the right
to vote."7 The Green court attempted to
distinguish the state's reliance upon Drue-
ding v. Devlin,7 8 which upheld a one-year
residency requirement for voting in Mary-
land, by stating that "it [certainly] takes
little logic to conclude that the need for
food, clothing and lodging has an aspect
of immediacy which differentiates it in
kind from the right to vote."'7 9 If this dis-
tinction were recognized by the Supreme
Court, then the right to welfare is arguably
more of a "fundamental liberty" under an
equal protection analysis than the right to
vote."" Unfortunately, the decision of the
Green court was not appealed by the State
of Delaware, and this language does not
appear in the record of any of the cases
appealed to the Supreme Court.8 1 Thus,
the Thompson decision does not reach
what can be deemed the central issue-
76270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967).
77 See Comment, The Constitutionality of Resi-
dence Requirements for State Welfare Recipients,
63 Nw. U.L. REV. 351, 367-68 (1969).
78 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), aJff'd per
curiam, 380 U.S. 125 (1965).
79 270 F. Supp. at 178.
80 Traditionally, the Supreme Court has treated
the right to vote as a "fundamental liberty" in
equal protection cases. See Harper v. Board of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating
Virginia's poll tax); Carrington v. Rash, 380
U.S. 89 (1965) (striking down Texas' constitu-
tional provision not allowing servicemen who
moved to Texas to vote while they remained in
the army); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 532
(1964) (holding the apportionment of the Ala-
bama legislature invalid).
81 Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D.
Conn. 1967); Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp.
22 (D. Pa. 1967); Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F.
Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1967).
whether there exists a basic constitutional
right to welfare.
In addition to the possible elevation of
welfare assistance from a privilege to a
right, there exists another theory which
could compel the courts to require society
to grant assistance to the indigent. This
idea is premised upon the contention that
although welfare was originally a "priv-
ilege," the government has transformed it
into a right by its initial voluntary assump-
tion of responsibility.8 2 This is analogous
to the common law rule of a "volunteer"
in torts.83 While the original obligation to
act does not rest upon the government,
once it does so act, it must act in a com-
petent manner, i.e., without negligence,
and it must finish its assumed burden. The
Social Security Act 4 was the initial step;
it carved out certain specific categories of
individuals, such as the aged,8 5 the blind,8 6
and children,T for whom the government
provided a basic cash income although
there was no acknowledgment of a general
social responsibility for the solution of the
problem. However, during the 1960's the
82 Harvith, Federal Equal Protection and Welfare
Assistance, 31 ALBANY L. REV. 210, 242-43
(1967).
8 3 PROSSER, TORTS 336-43 (3rd ed. 1964).
84 49 Stat. 620 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 301-1394 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 301-1396d (Supp. I 1965).
8 Social Security Act, Tit. I, 49 Stat. 620
(1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 301-06
(1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 302-06 (Supp.
I 1965).
86Social Security Act, Tit. X, 49 Stat. 645
(1935), as amended, 42 U.S.q. §§ 1201-06
(1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1202-06
(Supp. I 1965).
87 Social Security Act, Tit. IV, 49 Stat. 627
(1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-09
(1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 602-06 (Supp.
I 1965).
government has become committed to a
War on Poverty; and having made this
commitment, the government should be
compelled to carry "through with pro-
grams effective enough to provide every
American with access to the basic neces-
sities."88 Thus, it is contended that once
the government starts to shoulder the
burden, it assumes the task of successfully
completing its chore.8 9
Conclusion
The Supreme Court decision in Thomp-
son represents a major victory in the
welfare applicant's fight for basic human
dignity. In affirming three lower federal
court decisions, the Thompson Court
struck down state and federal residency
tests as a violation of both the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment and the citizen's inherent right to
freedom of travel as posited by the Guest
Court. The Court also applied the due pro-
cess clause of the fifth amendment to in-
validate the residency test imposed by the
District of Columbia. While the decision
represents a significant step forward, it
could present indigents with a mere pyrrhic
victory since the indigent's right to welfare
was not firmly established. A state could
conceivably circumvent the decision by
eliminating public assistance completely.
88 Harvith, supra note 82, at 243.
89 SMITH, supra note 67; see also Graham, supra
note 19.
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However, such an eventuality is highly im-
probable, and, in all likelihood, the crucial
issue of a constitutionally protected right
to welfare will probably never have to be
answered.
President Nixon in his address to the
nation on August 8, 1969 expressed what
is a generally accepted view by this coun-
try; our present welfare system is a total
failure and should be immediately over-
hauled by a massive infusion of federal aid.
Under his proposal, the present assistance
to the so-called adult categories-the aged,
disabled, and the blind-would be main-
tained, but the "aid to families with de-
pendent children", more commonly known
as welfare, would be eliminated. In its
place would arise a new plan-The Fam-
ily Assistance System-consisting of three
basic elements: (1) equality of treatment
across the country; (2) a work require-
ment; (3) and a work incentive.90 Linked
with this program would be the establish-
ment of national minimum benefits for the
"adult" categories under the Social Secur-
ity Act. It thus seems apparent that the
federal government intends to assume the
basic burden by building a foundation un-
der the income of every American family.
Hopefully, we will soon reach the plateau
where "every American [can] share the
bounty of this rich land."' '9 1
90 See N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1969, at 10, col. 1,
for the full text of President Nixon's address to
the nation.
91 Id. at col. 6.
